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Abstract
Tacit knowledge transfer and sharing can lead to synergy, both employees and enterprise can benefit from it. This 
paper discusses the setting of incentive mechanism in order to promote tacit knowledge transfer and sharing of 
employees in the case of asymmetric information, and establishes the incentive model applied double auction theory. 
We introduce the concept of favor degree to establish the trust mechanism in the process of trading, and we bring 
forward the repeated double auction model based on favor degree, improving the transaction success rate, and 
accelerating the long-term cooperative relationship between enterprise and employees, and solving the quantity 
problems of employees` promotion potential and the sense of belonging in the human resource management. And 
then we use an example to demonstrate the feasibility of repeated game model. 
© 2011 Published by Elsevier Ltd. Selection and/or peer-review under responsibility of [name organizer] 
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1. Introduction 
The 21st century, human society has entered an era leading by knowledge, the study of knowledge 
management is rise, knowledge is gradually replacing the traditional production factors , like labor、
capital and land, to become the core resource in enterprises[1].  Tacit knowledge transfer and sharing is 
the one of the most important study fields in the knowledge management[2]. Tacit knowledge transfer 
and sharing can lead to synergy, both employees and enterprise can benefit from it. But because the 
non-structured feature of tacit knowledge and asymmetric information between enterprise and employees, 
the tacit knowledge transfer and sharing is difficult. It has the problem whether incentive mechanism is 
effective or not in the trading of tacit knowledge transfer and sharing[3,4], although information 
technology can simplify the trading, it can not make the people generate motivation[5], so we should pay 
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our attention to the non-technical factors, especially the incentive mechanism[6]. Enterprise plays the 
important role in the tacit knowledge transfer and sharing, the knowledge transfer and sharing depends on 
the organized and designed human resource development and management. How to use the methods of 
organization、culture and incentive mechanism to promote tacit knowledge transfer and sharing is the 
core problem and chief challenge in enterprise knowledge management, and it is the important part in the 
human resource management. 
Tacit knowledge transfer and sharing is the research focus in knowledge management, many Domestic 
and foreign scholars have researched a lot about it. For example, the studies about features of tacit 
knowledge[8,9] and how to establish the model to realize the tacit knowledge transfer and sharing; the 
factors which influence tacit knowledge transfer and sharing[10,11]; tacit knowledge transfer and sharing 
among employees and so on[12,13,14]. Although there are a lot of papers talking tacit knowledge transfer 
and sharing, most studies are qualitative and don’t think about the concrete form of benefits and costs in 
the trading, so most studies is conceptual, or only discuss tacit knowledge transfer and sharing among 
employees, not involve the important role of enterprise in the trading. 
Double auction model brought forward by this paper designs the incentive mechanism to promote the 
tacit knowledge transfer and sharing in the case of asymmetric information, enterprise and employees 
make auction game, employees who have tacit knowledge is the sellers, enterprise who wants the 
knowledge is the buyer, the valuation of the two sides to the tacit knowledge is the basis of the game, 
both the enterprise and the employees pursuit the profit maximization of their own. Because it is the 
long-term cooperative relationship between the two sides, so the profit is not only include the present 
profit but also include the long-term profit, so one side should see another side as one kind of resource 
when they make a decision, and establish the long-term and mutual-benefit relationship. We introduce the 
concept of favor degree to establish the trust mechanism in the process of trading, and bring forward the 
repeated double auction model based on favor degree, expanding the trading band and improving the 
transaction success rate. 
2. Double auction model between enterprise and employees 
2.1 Problem Description 
Realizing tacit knowledge transfer and sharing needs the cooperation between enterprise and 
employees. However, in real economic activities, because of the asymmetric information, the 
employment contracts between enterprise and employees is incomplete, which don’t have the 
requirements of tacit knowledge transfer and sharing, can’t guarantee the effective cooperation of 
employees. In fact, the rational employees often hide their tacit knowledge. 
Because the tacit knowledge transfer and sharing plays important role in promotion of enterprise 
innovation and employee quality, and can brings enterprise interests, so enterprise has the need of tacit 
knowledge transfer and sharing, the employees who have tacit knowledge have the need of identification 
and economic compensation, so there is tacit knowledge mark within the enterprise. Employees who 
provide the tacit knowledge are sellers, enterprise who wants the tacit knowledge is buyer, the commodity 
is the tacit knowledge of employees, because of the tacit knowledge trading between enterprise and 
employees, it has games. Because knowledge has the nature of public goods, once the transfer and sharing, 
employees will lose its exclusive right, which is often the value expression of employees and the 
protection of occupational safety, so employees will lose the competitive advantage if they transfer and 
share their tacit knowledge, and they need to pay a certain price when they get the knowledge, such as 
time, money and efforts, so in order to make employees transfer and share their tacit knowledge, 
enterprise must give some motivation. 
ZHAO Yuqin et al. / Physics Procedia 24 (2012) 1789 – 1795 1791
Author name / Physics Procedia 00 (2011) 000–000 
2.2  Double Action Model Summary 
Double action model[15] is the model which discusses the trading between sellers and buyers in the 
case of asymmetric information. Buyers know the commodity’s value to themselves(but sellers don’t 
know), that is the buyers` valuation, assumed as bv , sellers know the cost or valuation of commodity(but 
buyers don’t know), assumed as sv , and assuming that both sides know the distribution of the valuation in 
[0，1]. The trading rules as follows: the buyer gives a bidding and the seller gives a price simultaneous, 
assumed the buyer’s bidding as bP , assumed the seller’s bidding as sP , if sb PP ≥ , then the transaction 
bidding is 
( )
2
sb PPP +=
, the buyer’s interest is Pvb − ,and the seller’s interest is svP − , if 
sb PP < , the trading fails, both sides` interest is 0. 
The cost or valuation of tacit knowledge from employees is the sum of the price paid for gaining the 
knowledge and the competitive advantage, the valuation of tacit knowledge from enterprise is the interest 
brought from tacit knowledge transfer and sharing, the bidding gave by enterprise bP (can in the form of 
position promotion, bonus, praise and recognition) must be higher than the cost of employees` tacit 
knowledge sP , the trading can succeed. 
The trading between enterprise and employees is in the case of asymmetric information, so it meets the 
requirement of double auction model, and we can use this model to establish the incentive mechanism in 
the trading of tacit knowledge transfer and sharing. 
2.3 Double Auction Model used to Stimulate the Employees’ Transfer and Sharing 
1) Suppose the both trading sides are rational people, in order to achieve the profit maximization. 
Buyer’s profit maximization: for any [0,1]bv ∈ , )( bb vP  must satisfy the  
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And )](/)([ sSbsS vpPvPE ≥  is the seller’s bidding which the buyer expects in the condition of 
sb PP ≥
Seller’s profit maximization: for any [0,1]sv ∈ , )( ss vP  must satisfy the 
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     (2) 
And ])(/)([ sbbbb PvPvPE ≥  is the buyer’s bidding which the seller expects in the condition of 
sb PP ≥
2) Suppose the transaction bidding strategies of both sides are linear, the biding strategies of buyer 
is bbbbb vcavP +=)( , ba  and bc are constant, [0,1]bv ∈ , and the bidding strategies of sellers is 
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sssss vcavP +=)( , sa and sc  are constant, ]1,0[∈sv . According to the formula (1) and (2), we 
can get: 
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According to the formula (3) and (4), we can get the equilibrium solution of Bayesian game in the case 
of one-step condition as: 
bbb vvp 3
2
12
1)( +=
                             (5) 
sss vvp 3
2
4
1)( +=
                              (6) 
2.4 Transaction Analysis 
Employees and enterprise games according to the value of tacit knowledge, according to the formula (5) 
and (6), we can find the band of transaction success in the linear biding strategies, only 
when )()( ssbb vPvP ≥ , that is 4
1+≥ sb vv
, the transaction can succeed, as shown in figure1. However, 
where sb vv ≥ ,the transaction should be successful, but the trading band is much smaller, can not 
successfully trade area is the shaded area in figure 1, the transaction success rate is only 56.25%, it means 
this game can not achieve the maximum efficiency state. 
Figure1. Trading range of linear equilibrium strategy 
3. repeated double auction model based on favor degree 
3.1 Repeated Game Based on Favor Degree 
The relationship between enterprise and employees is competitive and cooperative; it inevitably 
appears non-cooperative behaviors sometimes, so this paper introduces the concept of favor degree to 
ZHAO Yuqin et al. / Physics Procedia 24 (2012) 1789 – 1795 1793
Author name / Physics Procedia 00 (2011) 000–000 
establish the trust mechanism in the trading of tacit knowledge transfer and sharing. The favor degree of 
employees evaluated by enterprise is the index used to judge innovation sense，innovation quality and 
contribution awareness of employees; the favor degree evaluated by employees is the index used to reflect 
the satisfaction, recognition and loyalty of employees. using the concept to establish the reputation of 
each side in the process of trading, which can facilitate to keep the cooperative relationship when one side 
adopts the non-cooperative behaviors thought by the other side, in order to promote cooperation of the 
two sides, the target of the cooperation is profit maximization, but because it is long-term relationship 
between enterprise and employees, so the profit is not include the present profit but also include the 
long-term profit, so one side should see another side as one kind of resource when they make a decision, 
and establish the long-term and mutual-benefit relationship. So the favor degree maximization of its 
partner is also the pursued target. Around the benefit equilibrium, the cooperation partners sometimes are 
intimate and sometimes are not, so the favor degree is decided by the actual return rate. 
This paper introduces the concept of favor degree, and models it as the biological neurons. According 
to the threshold value effect of cell body, the activity of favor degree can be stimulated when the change 
of return rate is bigger than some value. The learning process of the cell is the adjustment process of 
weight, so the favor degree g is 
ggg Δ+=                                (7) 
The stimulation function is gΔ ,    
                                            0                 arr <− |'|
=Δg                                               (8) 
                                        ))'(exp(1
))'(exp(1
rr
rr
−−+
−−−
    arr ≥− |'|
And the r is the return rate of this trading, r’ is the average return rate, a is the threshold value. 
So the bidding in the repeated double auction game is 
max
1 2( ) * *
12 3rb b b b
p v v g Pα= + +
               (9) 
max
1 2( ) * *
4 3rs s s s
p v v g Pα= + −
                (10) 
And the maxP  is the max public bidding, α  is constant and (0,1]α ∈ .
3.2 Example Analysis 
It is long-term relationship between enterprise and employees, so they not only need to concern the 
profit in one trading, but also need to concern the long-term profit. If the cooperative relationship is good, 
the favor degree is high, enterprise and employees can give up some profit on the basis of profit 
maximization (the profit in the formula (5) and (6)), make the trading go on and get the long-term profit 
maximization. Buyer gives little higher bidding based on favor degree, like the formula (9), and sellers 
give little lower bidding like the formula (10), it can raise the success rate, and realize the common win. 
One employee of one enterprise, who does the information classification and masters the classification 
rules, classification speed is faster than others, and the correct rate is higher. The enterprise wants to 
transfer and share the rules summarized by the employee to others, in order to promote the work efficiency 
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and correct rate. The enterprise valuation and bidding about this tacit knowledge are 0.7bv = , 0.4bP = ,
and the employee valuation and biding are 0.3sv = , 0.5sP = , according to the double auction game, 
this trading will fail, but in repeated game, as long as some favor degree, both sides give up some profit, 
the trading can succeed. For example, if the favor degree is 0.3b sg g= = ,and 0.1α = , max 0.5p = ,
according to the formula (9)and(10),we can get: 0.55rbP = , 0.35rsP = , and the trading can succeed, 
the profit of each side is 0.25br = , 0.15sr = ,however, it is more than 0 when the trading failing gets, 
so the repeated game can meet the long-term profit maximization. 
4. Conclusion 
Because the asymmetric information between enterprise and employee, tacit knowledge is 
non-structured and difficult coding, so the tacit knowledge transfer and sharing becomes difficult, 
however, the tacit knowledge transfer and sharing plays important role in promotion of enterprise 
innovation and employee quality, so enterprise should adopt incentive mechanism to promote the tacit 
knowledge transfer and sharing. A game between enterprise and employees about the tacit knowledge 
transfer and sharing put forward by this paper has useful discussion on tacit knowledge transfer and 
sharing, such as : (1)this paper puts forward the model that use the double auction model and establish the 
incentive mechanism to promote the tacit knowledge transfer and sharing. (2) because the relationship 
between enterprise and employees is long-term, this paper introduces the concept of favor degree and 
establish the trust mechanism, and puts forward the repeated double auction game based on favor degree 
in order to make the both sides not only consider the present profit but also consider the long-term profit, 
enlarge the trading range and realize the long-term profit maximization. (3) the higher favor degree 
judged by employees can improve the satisfaction and loyalty of employees, enterprise also can judge the 
promotion potential of employees according to the times of trading and favor degree, so the repeated 
game based on favor degree partly solve the quantity problems of employees` promotion potential 
evaluated by enterprise and the sense of belonging.  
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